[Bugtraq] Johnson Controls - DSC TL280 - home alarm system - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
z · · Bugtraq
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-27871 Vendor of Product: Johnson Controls (formerly Tyco / DSC) Affected Product Code Base: TL280, 5.62.04.003 (latest) Affected Component: Communication with the Integration server Suggested description: The DSC Neo alarm system can interface with “integration servers” to notify about alarm events. These “integration servers” can also send arm/disarm events to the alarm system. The “Type 2” (ITv2) communication between the TL280 and “integration servers” uses AES in ECB mode. ECB mode is a weak, broken cryptography mode. It does not provide forward secrecy; there is no mutual authentication, and a single shared key is used to secure the communication. Only weak integrity protection (CRC) is provided in the protocol. Additional Information: During the initial setup, the fixed key 12345678123456781234567812345678 is used for the communication. Attack Type: Network CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 9.0 Critical Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Contributing Weakness: AES-ECB Mode (CWE-327) - this advisory Contributing Weakness: Default Cryptographic Key (CWE-1394) - 12345678123456781234567812345678 Combined Impact: An attacker who can observe the initial TL280 handshake (which uses a default key) can decrypt the negotiated AES session key. All subsequent panel<->cloud communications are then readable, including user disarm codes and installer access codes. The use of AES-ECB mode with no proper replay protection allows the attacker to replay previously captured disarm commands, silently changing the alarm state from armed to disarmed. The panel logs a sequence mismatch error but executes the command. Affected data includes: - User arm/disarm PIN codes - Installer programming codes - Motion sensor activation events (enabling occupancy profiling) - System configuration and zone status Physical security impact: Complete silent defeat of intrusion detection for homes and businesses protected by this system. Has the vendor confirmed or acknowledged the vulnerability? Yes. Reported via VulnCheck (CNA coordinator) on 2026-02-16. The Johnson Controls PSIRT confirmed receipt on 2026-02-27, assigned CVE-2026-27871 on 2026-03-24 with the title "DSC TL280 Internal Security Alarm - Use of Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm", reproduced the issue, and committed to a patch by 2026-08-01. Vendor contact point: https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/resources#Contact... Vulnerability Type: Other CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm Discoverer: z Reference: https://github.com/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/CVE-2026-27871.mdhttp... Disclosure timeline: Coordinated through VulnCheck (disclosure@vulncheck.com), with Johnson Controls PSIRT as the supplier CNA. Reporter credited as "z". - 2026-02-16 — Vulnerability reported to VulnCheck. - 2026-02-18 — VulnCheck confirms receipt; engages Johnson Controls (supplier CNA) for determination and CVE assignment. 120-day disclosure deadline set to 2026-06-18. Reporter shares the Wireshark dissector (decrypts panel↔cloud traffic given the static key and a captured session start) and notes the documented default setup key 12345678123456781234567812345678 plus a suspected key-exchange that would expose all future session keys. - 2026-02-19 — Reporter sends supporting references (OWASP WSTG, NIST SP 800-131A, Schneier) on why ECB is disallowed. - 2026-02-27 — Johnson Controls confirms receipt of the report. - 2026-03-24 — Johnson Controls PSIRT assigns CVE-2026-27871, title "DSC TL280 Internal Security Alarm - Use of Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"; CISA coordination draft in progress. - 2026-03-25 — Reporter shares PoC: (1) screenshot (tl280_AES_ECB.png) of the dissector decrypting initial TL280→cloud setup traffic, highlighting the server's 0x0632 (Change_Static_Keys) command — passive capture of the first session allows decryption of all future traffic, including user/installer codes; (2) screen recording demonstrating that a replayed disarm packet disarms the panel even without knowing any keys/codes, and despite the panel returning a sequence-number error. - 2026-04-23 — VulnCheck follows up with Johnson Controls (no update). - 2026-05-06 — Johnson Controls reports it is reproducing the issue; final fix tracking to ~September/October 2026; requests deadline extension. - 2026-05-14 — Johnson Controls provisionally allocates CVE-2026-27871 in its Trust Center case platform and proposes a 2026-08-31 deadline. - 2026-05-21 — Reporter agrees to an extension only to 2026-08-01. - 2026-06-02 — Johnson Controls PSIRT agrees to the 2026-08-01 deadline; states a patch is expected by 2026-08-01. - 2026-06-06 — Reporter acknowledges. - 2026-08-01 - This advisory published, no information on any patches from the vendor. - 2026-08-03 - 5.63 is allegedly published to fix these, could not download it, could not test it. Johnson Controls is silent, no communication from their side even though August 1 was an agreed date for disclosure. Bad CNA. PS: you might find some other goodies in the repo